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ABSTRACT
Flow correlation is the core technique used in a multitude of
deanonymization attacks on Tor. Despite the importance of flow
correlation attacks on Tor, existing flow correlation techniques are
considered to be ineffective and unreliable in linking Tor flows
when applied at a large scale, i.e., they impose high rates of false
positive error rates or require impractically long flow observations
to be able to make reliable correlations. In this paper, we show that,
unfortunately, flow correlation attacks can be conducted on Tor
traffic with drastically higher accuracies than before by leveraging
emerging learning mechanisms. We particularly design a system,
called DeepCorr, that outperforms the state-of-the-art by signifi-
cant margins in correlating Tor connections. DeepCorr leverages
an advanced deep learning architecture to learn a flow correlation
function tailored to Tor’s complex network—this is in contrast to
previous works’ use of generic statistical correlation metrics to cor-
related Tor flows. We show that with moderate learning, DeepCorr
can correlate Tor connections (and therefore break its anonymity)
with accuracies significantly higher than existing algorithms, and
using substantially shorter lengths of flow observations. For in-
stance, by collecting only about 900 packets of each target Tor flow
(roughly 900KB of Tor data), DeepCorr provides a flow correlation
accuracy of 96% compared to 4% by the state-of-the-art system of
RAPTOR using the same exact setting.
We hope that our work demonstrates the escalating threat of
flow correlation attacks on Tor given recent advances in learning
algorithms, calling for the timely deployment of effective counter-
measures by the Tor community.
1 INTRODUCTION
Tor [15] is the most widely used anonymity system with more
than 2 million daily users [71]. It provides anonymity by relaying
clients’ traffic through cascades of relays, known as onion-circuits,
therefore concealing the association between the IP addresses of
the communicating parties. Tor’s network comprises around 7,000
public relays, carrying terabytes of traffic every day [71]. Tor is
used widely not only by dissidents, journalists, whistleblowers, and
businesses, but also by ordinary citizens to achieve anonymity and
blocking resistance.
To be usable for everyday Internet activities like web browsing,
Tor aims to provide low-latency communications. To make this pos-
sible, Tor relays refrain from obfuscating traffic features like packet
timings as doing so will slow down the connections.1 Consequently,
Tor is known to be susceptible to flow correlation attacks [13, 48, 65]
1Note that some Tor bridges (but not the public relays) obfuscate traffic characteris-
tics of the Tor flows between themselves and censored clients by using various Tor
pluggable transports [58].
in which an adversary tries to link the egress and ingress segments
of a Tor connection by comparing their traffic characteristics, in
particular their packet timings and packet sizes.
This paper studies flow correlation attacks on Tor. Flow cor-
relation is the core technique used in a wide spectrum of the
attacks studied against Tor (and similar anonymity systems) [8,
18, 34, 36, 67, 69]. For instance, in the predecessor attack [79] an
adversary who controls/eavesdrops multiple Tor relays attempts
at deanonymizing Tor connections by applying flow correlation
techniques. The Tor project adopted “guard” relays to limit such
an adversary’s chances of placing herself on the two ends of a
target Tor connection. Borisov et al. [8] demonstrated an active
denial-of-service attack that increases an adversary’s chances of
observing the two ends of a target user’s Tor connections (who then
performs flow correlation). Alternatively, various routing attacks
have been presented on Tor [18, 36, 67, 69] that aim at increasing
an adversary’s odds of intercepting the flows to be correlated by
manipulating the routing decisions.
Despite the critical role of flow correlation in a multitude of
Tor attacks, flow correlating Tor connections has long been consid-
ered to be inefficient at scale [35, 52, 63]—but not anymore! Even
though Tor relays do not actively manipulate packet timings and
sizes to resist flow correlation, the Tor network naturally perturbs
Tor packets by significant amounts, rendering flow correlation a
difficult problem in Tor. Specifically, Tor connections experience
large network jitters, significantly larger than normal Internet con-
nections. Such large perturbations are resulted by congestion on
Tor relays, which is due to the imbalance between Tor’s capacity
and the bandwidth demand from the clients. Consequently, existing
flow correlation techniques [32, 42, 50, 69] suffer from high rates of
false positives and low accuracies, unless they are applied on very
long flow observations and/or impractically small sets of target
flows. For instance, the state-of-the-art flow correlation of RAP-
TOR [69] achieves good correlation performance in distinguishing
a small set of only 50 target connections, and even this requires
the collection of 100 MB over 5 minutes of traffic for each of the
intercepted flows.
In this work, we take flow correlation attacks on Tor to real-
ity. We develop tools that are able to correlate Tor flows with ac-
curacies significantly higher than the state-of-the-art—when ap-
plied to large anonymity sets and using very short observations
of Tor connections. We argue that existing flow correlation tech-
niques [12, 32, 42, 50, 65, 69] are inefficient in correlating Tor traffic
as they make use of generic statistical correlation algorithms that
are not able to capture the dynamic, complex nature of noise in Tor.
As opposed to using such general-purpose statistical correlation
algorithms, in this paper we use deep learning to learn a correlation
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function that is tailored to Tor’s ecosystem. Our flow correlation sys-
tem, called DeepCorr, then uses the learned correlation function to
cross-correlate live Tor flows. Note that contrary to website finger-
printing attacks [9, 25, 55, 72, 73], DeepCorr does not need to learn
any target destinations or target circuits; instead DeepCorr learns
a correlation function that can be used to link flows on arbitrary
circuits, and to arbitrary destinations. In other words, DeepCorr can
correlate the two ends of a Tor connection even if the connection
destination has not been part of the learning set. Also, DeepCorr
can correlate flows even if they are sent over Tor circuits different
than the circuits used during the learning process. This is possible
as DeepCorr’s neural network learns the generic features of noise
in Tor, regardless of the specific circuits and end-hosts used during
the training process.
We demonstrate DeepCorr’s strong performance through large
scale experiments on live Tor network. We browse the top 50,000
Alexa websites over Tor, and evaluate DeepCorr’s true positive and
false positive rates in correlating the ingress and egress segments
of the recorded Tor connections. To the best of our knowledge, our
dataset is the largest dataset of correlated Tor flows, which we have
made available to the public. Our experiments show that DeepCorr
can correlate Tor flows with accuracies significantly superior to
existing flow correlation techniques. For instance, compared to the
state-of-the-art flow correlation algorithm of RAPTOR [69], Deep-
Corr offers a correlation accuracy2 of 96% compared to RAPTOR’s
accuracy of 4% (when both collect 900 packets of traffic from each of
the intercepted flows)! The following is a highlight of DeepCorr’s
performance:
• We train DeepCorr using 25,000 Tor flows generated by
ourselves. Training DeepCorr takes about a day on a sin-
gle TITAN X GPU, however we show that an adversary
needs to re-train DeepCorr only about once every month
to preserve its correlation performance.
• DeepCorr can be used as a generic correlation function:
DeepCorr’s performance is consistent for various test
datasets with different sizes and containing flows routed
over different circuits.
• DeepCorr outperforms prior flow correlation algorithms by
very large margins. Importantly, DeepCorr enables the cor-
relation of Tor flows with flow observations much shorter
than what is needed by previous work. For instance, with
only 300 packets, DeepCorr achieves a true positive rate
of 0.8 compared to less than 0.05 by prior work (for a fixed
false positive rate of 10−3).
• DeepCorr’s performance rapidly improves with longer flow
observations and with larger training sets.
• DeepCorr’s correlation time is significantly faster than pre-
vious work for the same target accuracy. For instance, each
DeepCorr correlation takes 2ms compared to RAPTOR’s
more than 20ms, when both target a 95% on identical
dataset.
2To be fair, in our comparison with RAPTOR we derive the accuracy metric similar
to RAPTOR’s paper [69]: each flow is paired with only one flow out of all evaluated
flows. For the rest of our experiments, each flow can be declared as correlated with
arbitrary number of intercepted flows, which is a more realistic (and more challenging)
assumption.
We hope that our study raises concerns in the community on the
escalating risks of large-scale traffic analysis on Tor communica-
tions in light of the emerging deep learning algorithms. A possible
countermeasure to DeepCorr is deploying traffic obfuscation tech-
niques, such as those employed by Tor pluggable transports [58], on
all Tor traffic. We evaluate the performance of DeepCorr on each of
Tor’s currently-deployed pluggable transports, showing that meek
and obfs4-iat0 provide little protection against DeepCorr’s flow
correlation, while obfs4-iat1 provides a better protection against
DeepCorr (note that none of these obfuscation mechanisms are
currently deployed by public Tor relays, and even obfs4-iat1 is
deployed by a small fraction of Tor bridges [52]). This calls for
designing effective traffic obfuscation mechanisms to be deployed
by Tor relays that do not impose large bandwidth and performance
overheads on Tor communications.
Finally, note that while we present DeepCorr as a flow correla-
tion attack on Tor, it can be used to correlate flows in other flow
correlation applications as well. To demonstrate this, we also apply
DeepCorr to the problem of stepping stone detection [6, 24, 77]
showing that DeepCorr significantly outperforms previous stepping
stone detection algorithms in unreliable network settings.
Organization: The rest if this paper is organized as follows.
2 PRELIMINARIES AND MOTIVATION
Flow correlation attacks, also referred to as confirmation attacks,
are used to link network flows in the presence of encryption and
other content obfuscation mechanisms [13, 17, 24, 43, 50, 65, 78, 82].
In particular, flow correlation techniques can break anonymity in
anonymous communication systems like Tor [15] and mix net-
works [14, 61, 62] by linking the egress and ingress segments
of the anonymous connections through correlating traffic fea-
tures [4, 13, 48, 60, 65, 75, 76, 83]. Alternatively, flow correlation
techniques can be used to identify cybercriminals who use network
proxies to obfuscate their identities, i.e., stepping stone attack-
ers [66, 80, 82].
2.1 Threat Model
Figure 1 shows the main setting of a flow correlation scenario. The
setting consists of a computer network (e.g., Tor’s network) with
M ingress flows and N egress flows. Some of the egress flows are
the obfuscated versions of some of the ingress flows; however, the
relation between such flows can not detected using packet con-
tents due to the use of encryption and similar content obfuscation
techniques like onion encryption. For instance, in the case of Tor,
Fi and Fj are the entry and exit segments of one Tor connection
(see Figure 1), however, such association can not be detected by
inspecting the packet contents of Fi and Fj due to onion encryption.
We call (Fi , Fj ) a pair of associated flows.
The goal of an adversary in this setting is to identify (some or
all of) the associated flow pairs, e.g., (Fi , Fj ), by comparing traf-
fic characteristics, e.g., packet timings and sizes, across all of the
ingress and egress flows. Linking associated flow pairs using traffic
characteristics is called flow correlation.
A flow correlation adversary can intercept network flows at
various network locations. A Tor adversary, in particular, can inter-
cept Tor flows either by running malicious Tor relays [8, 34, 79] or
2
Figure 1: The main setting of a flow correlation attack on Tor. The adversary intercepts Tor flows either by running malicious
Tor relays or wiretapping Internet ASes and IXPs.
by controlling/wiretapping Internet ASes or IXPs [37, 67, 69]. We
further elaborate on this in Section 2.3.
Note that in this paper we study passive flow correlation attacks
only; therefore, active flow correlation techniques, also known
as flow watermarks as introduced in Section 2.5, are out of the
scope of this paper. Also, flow correlation is different from website
fingerprinting attacks, as discussed in Section 2.5.
2.2 Existing Flow Correlation Techniques
As mentioned before, flow correlation techniques use traffic fea-
tures, particularly, packet timings, packet sizes, and their variants
(e.g., flow rates, inter-packet delays, etc.), to correlate and link net-
work flows (recall that packet contents can not be used to link flows
in this setting due to content obfuscation, e.g., onion encryption).
For instance, the early work of Paxson and Zhang [82] models
packet arrivals as a series of ON and OFF patterns, which they
use to correlate network flows, and Blum et al. [7] correlate the
aggregate sizes of network packets over time. Existing flow correla-
tion techniques mainly use standard statistical correlation metrics to
correlate the vectors of flow timings and sizes across flows. In the
following, we overview the major types of statistical correlation
metrics used by previous flow correlation algorithms.
Mutual Information The mutual information metric measures
the dependency of two random variables. It, therefore, can be used
to quantify the correlation of flow features across flows, e.g., the
traffic features of an egress Tor flow depends on the features of its
corresponding ingress flow. The mutual information technique has
been used by Chothia et al. [12] and Zhu et al. [84] to link flows.
This metric, however, requires a long vector of features (e.g., long
flows) in order to make reliable decisions, as it needs to reconstruct
and compare the empirical distributions of traffic features of target
flows.
Pearson Correlation The Pearson Correlation coefficient is a
classic statistical metric for linear correlation between random
variables. Unlike the mutual information metric, the Pearson Cor-
relation metric does not need to build the empirical distribution
of the variables it is correlating, and therefore can be applied on
a shorter length of data. The Pearson Correlation metric has been
used by several flow correlation systems [42, 65].
Cosine Similarity The Cosine similarity metric measures the
angular similarity of two random variables. Similar to the Pearson
coefficient, it can be directly applied on the sample vectors of two
random variables. This metric has been used by different timing
and size correlation systems [32, 50] to link network flows.
Spearman Correlation The Spearman rank correlation metric
measures the statistical dependence between the rankings of two
variables. The metric can be defined as the Pearson correlation
between ranked variables. The recent work of RAPTOR [69] uses
this metric to correlate Tor flows.
2.3 Flow Correlation Attacks on Tor
Flow correlation is the core technique used in a broad range of
attacks studied against Tor (and other anonymity systems). To be
able to perform flow correlation, an adversary needs to observe
(i.e., intercept) some fraction of flows entering and exiting the
Tor network. The adversary can then deanonymize a specific Tor
connection, if she is able to intercept both of the ingress and egress
segments of that Tor connection (by performing a flow correlation
algorithm on those flow segments). Therefore, an adversary can
increase her chances of deanonymizing Tor connections by trying
to intercept a larger fraction of Tor’s ingress and egress flows.
There are two main approaches an attacker can take to increase
the fraction of Tor connections she is intercepting. First, by running
a large number of Tor relays and recording the traffic features of
the Tor connections they relay. Various studies have shown that
an adversary with access to such malicious relays can increase
her chances of intercepting the both ends of a Tor connection in
different ways [3, 8, 26, 46, 79]. For instance, Borisov et al. [8]
demonstrate an active denial-service-attack to increase the chances
of intercepting the ingress and egress segments of a target client’s
Tor traffic. The Tor project has adopted the concept of Tor guard
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relays [19] to reduce the chances of performing flow correlation by
an adversary controlling malicious relays, an attack known as the
predecessor attack [79].
Alternatively, an adversary can increase her opportunities of per-
forming flow correlation by controlling/wiretapping autonomous
systems (ASes) or Internet exchange points (IXPs), and record-
ing the traffic features of the Tor connections that they transit.
Several studies [20, 49, 69] demonstrate that specific ASes and
IXPs intercept a significant fraction of Tor traffic, therefore are
capable of performing flow correlation on Tor at large scale. Oth-
ers [18, 36, 37, 67, 69] show that an AS-level adversary can further
increase her chances of flow correlation by performing various
routing manipulations that reroute a larger fraction of Tor connec-
tions through her adversarial ASes and IXPs. For instance, Starov
et al. [67] recently show that approximately 40% of Tor circuits are
vulnerable to flow correlation attacks by a single malicious AS, and
Sun et al. [69] show that churn in BGP as well as active manipula-
tion of BGP updates can amplify an adversarial AS’s visibility on
Tor connections. This has lead to various proposals on deploying
AS-aware path selection mechanisms for Tor [2, 18, 51].
2.4 This Paper’s Contributions
While flow correlation is the core of a multitude of attacks on
Tor [3, 8, 18, 20, 26, 36, 37, 46, 49, 51, 67, 69, 69, 79], existing flow
correlation algorithms are assumed to be ineffective in linking Tor
connections reliably and at scale [35, 52, 63]. This is due to Tor’s
extremely noisy network that applies large perturbations on Tor
flows, therefore rendering traffic features across associated ingress
and egress Tor flows hard to get reliably correlated. In particular,
Tor’s network applies large network jitters on Tor flows, which is
due to congestion on Tor relays, and many Tor packets are frag-
mented and repacketized due to unreliable network conditions.
Consequently, existing flow correlation techniques offer poor corre-
lation performances—unless applied to very large flow observations
as well as unrealistically small sets of target flows.3 For instance,
the state-of-the-art correlation technique of Sun et al. [69] needs to
observe 100MB of traffic from each target flow for around 5 min-
utes to be able to perform reliable flow correlations. Such long flow
observations not only are impractical due to the short-lived nature
of typical Tor connections (e.g., web browsing sessions), but also
impose unbearable storage requirements if applied at large scale
(e.g., a malicious Tor relay will likely intercepte tens of thousands
of concurrent flows). Moreover, existing techniques suffer from
high rates of false positive correlations unless applied on an unre-
alistically small set of suspected flows, e.g., Sun et al. [69] correlate
among a set of only 50 target flows.
Our Approach: We believe that the main reason for the ineffec-
tiveness of existing flow correlation techniques is the intensity as
well as the unpredictability of network perturbations in Tor. We
argue that previous flow correlation techniques are inefficient in
correlating Tor traffic since they make use of general-purpose statis-
tical correlation algorithms that are not able to capture the dynamic,
complex nature of noise in Tor. As opposed to using such generic
3Note that active attacks like [65] are out of our scope, as discussed in Section 2.5, since
such attacks are easily detectable, and therefore can not be deployed by an adversary
at large scale for a long time period without being detected.
statistical correlation metrics, in this paper we use deep learning
to learn a correlation function that is tailored to Tor’s ecosystem. We
design a flow correlation system, called DeepCorr, that learns a
flow correlation function for Tor, and uses the learned function to
cross-correlate live Tor connections. Note that contrary to website
fingerprinting attacks [9, 25, 55, 72, 73], DeepCorr does not need
to learn any target destinations or target circuits; instead Deep-
Corr learns a correlation function that can be used to link flows
on arbitrary circuits, and to arbitrary destinations. In other words,
DeepCorr can correlate the two ends of a Tor connection even if
the connection destination has not been part of the learning set.
Also, DeepCorr can correlate flows even if they are sent over Tor
circuits different than the circuits used during the training process.
We demonstrate DeepCorr’s strong correlation performance
through large scale experiments on live Tor network, which we
compare to previous flow correlation techniques. We hope that our
study raises concerns in the community on the increasing risks
of large-scale traffic analysis on Tor in light of emerging learning
algorithms. We discuss potential countermeasures, and evaluate
DeepCorr’s performance against existing countermeasures.
2.5 Related Topics Out of Our Scope
Active flow correlation (watermarking) Network flow water-
marking is an active variant of the flow correlation techniques intro-
duced above. Similar to passive flow correlation schemes, flow wa-
termarking aims at linking network flows using traffic features that
persist content obfuscation, i.e., packet sizes and timings. By con-
trast, flow watermarking systems need tomanipulate the traffic fea-
tures of the flows they intercept in order to be able to perform flow
correlation. In particular, many flow watermarking systems [27–
29, 31, 59, 76, 81] perturb packet timings of the intercepted flows by
slightly delaying network packets to modulate an artificial pattern
into the flows, called the watermark. For instance, RAINBOW [31]
manipulates the inter-packet delays of network packets in order
to embed a watermark signal. Several proposals [30, 41, 59, 76, 81],
known as interval-based watermarks, work by delaying packets
into secret time intervals.
While passive flow correlation attacks (studied in this paper) are
information theoretically undetectable, a watermarking adversary
may reveal herself by applying traffic perturbations that differ from
that of normal traffic. Some active correlation techniques [11, 65]
do not even aim for invisibility, therefore they can be trivially
detected and disabled, making them unsuitable for large scale flow
correlation. Additionally, while passive flow correlation algorithms
can be computed offline, flow watermarks need to be performed by
resourceful adversaries who are able to apply traffic manipulations
on live Tor connections. In this paper, we only focus on passive
flow correlation techniques.
Website Fingerprinting Website fingerprinting attacks [9, 22,
23, 25, 38, 44, 54, 55, 72–74] use a different threat model than flow
correlation techniques. In website fingerprinting, an adversary in-
tercepts a target client’s ingress Tor traffic (e.g., by wiretapping
the link between a Tor client and her guard relay), and compares
the intercepted ingress Tor connection to the traffic fingerprints
of a finite (usually small) set of target websites. This is unlike flow
correlation attacks in which the adversary intercepts the two ends of
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an anonymous connection, enabling the attacker to deanonymize
arbitrary senders and receivers. Existing website fingerprinting
systems leverage standard machine learning algorithms such as
SVM and kNN to classify and identify target websites, and recent
work [64] has investigated the use of deep learning for website
fingerprinting. In contrary, as overviewed in Section 2.2, prior pas-
sive flow correlation techniques use statistical correlation metrics
to link traffic characteristics across network flows. We consider
website fingerprinting orthogonal to our work as it is based on
different threat model and techniques.
3 INTRODUCING DeepCorr
In this section, we introduce our flow correlation system, called
DeepCorr, which uses deep learning algorithms to learn correlation
functions.
3.1 Features and Their Representation
Similar to existing flow correlation techniques overviewed earlier,
our flow correlation system uses the timings and sizes of network
flows to cross-correlate them. A main advantage [21] of deep learn-
ing algorithms over conventional learning techniques is that a deep
learningmodel can be providedwith raw data features as opposed to
engineered traffic features (like those used by SVM- and kNN-based
website fingerprinting techniques [9, 22, 23, 25, 44, 54, 55, 72, 73]).
This is because deep learning is able to extract complex, effective
features from the raw input features [21] itself. Therefore, DeepCorr
takes raw flow features as input, and uses them to derive complex
features, which is used by its correlation function.
We represent a bidirectional network flow, i , with the following
array:
Fi = [Tui ; Sui ;Tdi ; Sdi ]
where T is the vector of inter-packet delays (IPD) of the flow i ,
S is the vector of i’th packet sizes, and the u and d superscripts
represent “upstream” and “downstream” sides of the bidirectional
flow i (e.g., Tui is the vector of upstream IPDs of i). Also, note that
we only use the first ℓ elements of each of the vectors, e.g., only
the first ℓ upstream IPDs. If a vector has fewer than ℓ elements, we
pad it to ℓ by appending zeros. We will use the flow representation
Fi during our learning process.
Now suppose that we aim at correlating two flows i and j (say i
was intercepted by amalicious Tor guard relay and j was intercepted
by an accomplice exit relay). We represent this pair of flows with
the following two-dimensional array composed of 8 rows:
Fi, j = [Tui ;Tuj ;Tdi ;Tdj ; Sui ; Suj ; Sdi ; Sdj ]
where the lines of the array are taken from the flow representations
Fi and Fj .
3.2 Network Architecture
We use a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) [21] to learn a
correlation function for Tor’s noisy network. We use a CNN since
network flow features can be modeled as time series, and the CNNs
are known to have good performance on time series [21]. Also,
the CNNs are invariant to the position of the patterns in the data
stream [21], which makes them ideal to look for possibly shifted
traffic patterns.4
Figure 2 shows the structure of DeepCorr’s CNN network. The
network takes a flow pair Fi, j as the input (on the left side). Deep-
Corr’s architecture is composed of two layers of convolution and
three layers of a fully connected neural network. The first convolu-
tion layer has k1 kernels each of size (2,w1), where k1 andw1 are
the hyperparameters, and we use a stride of (2, 1). The intuition
behind using the first convolution layer is to capture correlation
between the adjacent rows of the input matrix Fi, j , which are sup-
posed to be correlated for associated Tor flows, e.g., between Tui
and Tuj .
DeepCorr’s second convolution layer aims at capturing traffic
features from the combination of all timing and size features. At
this layer, DeepCorr uses k2 kernels each of size (4,w2), where k2
andw2 are also our hyperparameters, and it uses a stride of (4, 1).
The output of the second convolution layer is flattened and fed
to a fully connected network with three layers. DeepCorr uses
max pooling after each layer of convolution to ensure permutation
invariance and to avoid overfitting [21]. Finally, the output of the
network is:
pi, j = Ψ(Fi, j )
which is used to decide if the two input flows in Fi, j are correlated
or not. To normalize the output of the network, we apply a sigmoid
function [21] that scales the output between zero and one. Therefore,
pi, j shows the probability of the flows i and j being associated
(correlated), e.g., being the entry and exit segments of the same Tor
connection.
DeepCorr declares the flows i and j to be correlated if pi, j > η,
where η is our detection threshold discussed during the experiments.
The parameters (w1,w2,k1,k2) are the hyperparameters of our
system; we will tune their values through experiments.
3.3 Training
To train our network, we use a large set of flow pairs that we
created over Tor. This includes a large set of associated flow pairs,
and a large set of non-associated flow pairs. An associated flow
pair, Fi, j , consists of the two segments of a Tor connection (e.g.,
i and j are the ingress and egress segments of a Tor connection).
We label an associated pair with yi, j = 1. On the other hand, each
non-associated flow pair (i.e., a negative sample) consists of two
arbitrary Tor flows that do not belong to the same Tor connection.
We label such non-associated pairs with yi, j = 0. For each captured
Tor entry flow, i , we create Nneд negative samples by forming Fi, j
pairs where j is the exit segment of an arbitrary Tor connection.
Nneд is a hyperparameter whose value will be obtained through
experiments.
4Note that our work is the first to use a learning mechanism for flow correlation. In
our search of effective learning mechanisms for flow correlation, we tried various
algorithms including fully connected neural networks, recurrent neural network (RNN),
and support vector machine (SVM). However, CNN provided the best flow correlation
performance compared to all the other algorithms we investigated, which is intuitively
because CNNs are known to work better for longer data lengths. For instance, we
achieved an accuracy of only 0.4 using fulling-connected neural networks, which is
significantly lower than our performance with CNNs.
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Figure 2: The network architecture of DeepCorr.
Finally, we define DeepCorr’s loss function using a cross-entropy
function as follows:
L = − 1|F |
∑
Fi, j ∈F
yi, j logΨ(Fi, j ) + (1 − yi, j ) log(1 − Ψ(Fi, j )) (1)
where F is our training dataset, composed of all associated and
non-associated flow pairs. We used the Adam optimizer [40] to
minimize the loss function in our experiments. The learning rate
of the Adam optimizer is another hyperparameter of our system.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we discuss our data collection and its ethics, the
choice of our hyperparameters, and our evaluation metrics.
4.1 Datasets and Collection
Figure 3 shows our experimental setup for our Tor experiments.
We used several Tor clients that we ran inside separate VMs to
generate and collect Tor traffic. We use each of our Tor clients to
browse the top 50,000 Alexa websites over Tor, and captured the
flows entering and exiting the Tor network for these connections
(we use half of the connections for training, and the other half for
testing). Therefore, the entering flows are in Tor cell format, and
the flows exiting Tor are in regular HTTP/HTTPS format. We used
1,000 arbitrary Tor circuits for browsing websites over Tor, i.e., each
circuit was used to browse roughly 50 websites. We used different
guard nodes in forming our Tor circuits; we were able to alternate
our guard nodes so by disabling Vanilla Tor’s option that enforces
guard relay reuse. We also used a regular Firefox browser, instead
of Tor’s browser, to be able to enforce circuit selection. We used
Tor version 0.3.0.9, automated by a Python script.
Note that we did not set up our own Tor relays for the purpose
of the experiments, and we merely used public Tor relays in all of
our experiments. We captured the ingress Tor flows using tcpdump
on our Tor clients. To capture the egress Tor traffic (i.e., traffic
from exit relays to websites), we made our exit Tor traffic tunnel
through our own SOCKS proxy server (as shown in Figure 3), and
we collected the exit Tor traffic on our own SOCKS proxy server
using tcpdump. Note that using this data collection proxy may
add additional latency on the collected flows, so the performance
of DeepCorr in practice is better than what we report through
experiments. We also collected 500 websites through Tor pluggable
transport to evaluate them as countermeasures against DeepCorr.
We collected our Tor traffic in two steps: first, we collected traffic
over a two weeks period, and then with a three months gap we
collected more Tor traffic for a one month period (in order to show
the impact of time on training). We have made our dataset available
publicly. To the best of our knowledge, this is largest dataset of
correlated Tor flows, and we hope it will be useful to the research
community.
Note that while we only collect web traffic, this is not a constraint
of DeepCorr, and it can be used to correlate arbitrary Tor traffic.
4.2 Ethics of Data Collection
To make sure we did not overload Tor’s network, we ran up to 10
concurrent Tor connections during our data collection. Also, we
alternated the guard nodes used in our circuits to evade overloading
any specific circuits or relays. We did not browse any illegal content
over Tor, and we used an idle time between connections of each of
our clients. As explained above, we collected our ingress and egress
Tor flows on our own Tor clients as well as our own SOCKS proxy
server; therefore, we did not collect any traffic of other Tor users.
In our experiments with Tor pluggable transports, we collected
a much smaller set of flows compared to our bare Tor experiments;
we did so because Tor bridges are very scarce and expensive, and
therefore we avoided overloading the bridges.
4.3 Choosing the Hyperparameters
We used Tensorflow [1] to implement the neural networks of Deep-
Corr. We tried various values for different hyperparameters of our
system to optimize the flow correlation performance. To optimize
each of the parameters, our network took about a day to converge
(we used a single Nvidia TITAN X GPU).
For the learning rate, we tried {0.001, 0.0001, 0.0005, 0.00005},
and we got the best performance with a learning rate of
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Figure 3: Our experimental setup on Tor
Table 1: DeepCorr’s hyperparameters optimized to correlate
Tor traffic.
Layer Details
Convolution Layer 1
Kernel num: 2000
Kernel size: (2, 30)
Stride: (2,1)
Activation: Relu
Max Pool 1 Window size: (1,5)Stride: (1,1)
Convolution Layer 2
Kernel nume: 1000
Kernel size: (2, 10)
Stride: (4,1)
Activation: Relu
Max Pool 2 Window size: (1,5)Stride: (1,1)
Fully connected 1 Size: 3000, Activation: Relu
Fully connected 2 Size: 800, Activation: Relu
Fully connected 3 Size: 100, Activation: Relu
0.0001. As for the number of negative samples, Nneд , we tried
{9, 49, 99, 199, 299} and 199 gave us the best results. For the window
sizes of the convolution layers,w1 andw2, we tried {5, 10, 20, 30}.
Our best results occurred withw1 = 30 andw2 = 10. We also exper-
imented with {2, 5, 10} for the size of the max pooling, and a max
pooling of 5 gave the best performance. Finally, for the number of
the kernels, k1,k2, we tried {500, 1000, 2000, 3000}, and k1 = 2000
and k2 = 1000 resulted in the best performance. We present the
values of these parameters and other parameters of the system in
Table 1.
4.4 Evaluation Metrics
Similar to previous studies, we use the true positive (TP) and false
positive (FP) error rates as the main metrics for evaluating the
performance of flow correlation techniques. The TP rate measures
the fraction of associated flow pairs that are correctly declared to
be correlated by DeepCorr (i.e., a flow pair (i ,j) where i and j are the
segments of the same Tor connection, and we have pi, j > η). On the
other hand, the FP rate measures the fraction of non-associated flow
pairs that are mistakenly identified as correlated by DeepCorr (e.g.,
when i and j are the segments of two unrelated Tor connections,
yet pi, j > η). To evaluate FP, DeepCorr correlates every collected
entry flow to every collected exit flow, therefore, we perform about
(25, 000 − 1)2 false correlations for each of our experiments (we
have 25, 000 Tor connections in our test dataset).
Note that the detection threshold ηmakes a trade off between the
FP and TP rates; therefore we make use of ROC curves to compare
DeepCorr to other algorithms.
Finally, in our comparisons with RAPTOR [69], we additionally
use the accuracy metric (the sum of true positive and true negative
correlations over all correlations), which is used in the RAPTOR
paper. To have a fair comparison, we derive the accuracy metric
similar to RAPTOR: each flow is declared to be associated with
only a single flow out of all evaluated flows, e.g., the flow that
results in the maximum correlation metric, pi, j . For the rest of our
experiments, each flow can be declared as correlated with arbitrary
number of intercepted flows (i.e., any pairs that pi, j > η), which is
a more realistic (and more challenging) setting.
5 EXPERIMENT RESULTS
In this section we present and discuss our experimental results.
5.1 A First Look at the Performance
As described in the experimental setup section, we browse 50,000
top Alexa websites over Tor and collect their ingress and egress
flow segments. We use half of the collected traces to train DeepCorr
(as described earlier). Then, we use the other half of the collected
flows to test DeepCorr. Therefore, we feed DeepCorr about 25, 000
pairs of associated flow pairs, and 25, 000 × 24, 999 ≈ 6.2 × 108
pairs of non-associated flow pairs for training. We only use the first
ℓ = 300 packets of each flow (for shorter flows, we pad them to
300 packets by adding zeros). Figure 4 presents the true positive
and false positive error rates of DeepCorr for different values of the
threshold η. As expected, η trades off the TP and FP error rates. The
figure shows a promising performance for DeepCorr in correlating
Tor flows—using only 300 packets of each flow. For instance, for a
FP of 10−3, DeepCorr achieves a TP close to 0.8. As shown in the
following, this is drastically better than the performance of previous
work. Note that increasing the length of the flows will increase the
accuracy, as shown later.
5.2 DeepCorr Can Correlate Arbitrary Circuits
and Destinations
As discussed earlier, DeepCorr learns a correlation function for
Tor that can be used to correlate Tor flows on—any circuits—and
to—any destinations—regardless of the circuits and destinations
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Figure 4: True positive and false positive error rates of Deep-
Corr in detecting correlated pairs of ingress and egress Tor
flows for different detection thresholds (η). Each flow is only
300 packets.
used during the training process. To demonstrate this, we compare
DeepCorr’s performance in two experiments, each consisting 2, 000
Tor connections, therefore 2, 000 associated pairs and 2, 000× 1, 999
non-associated flow pairs. In the first experiment, the flows tested
for correlation by DeepCorr use the same circuits and destinations
as the flows used during DeepCorr’s training. In the second experi-
ment, the flows tested for correlation by DeepCorr (1) use circuits
that are totally different from the circuits used during training, (2)
are targeted to web destinations different from those used during
training, and (3) are collected one week after the learning flows.
Figure 5 compares DeepCorr’s ROC curve for the two experiments.
As can be seen, DeepCorr performs similarly in both of the experi-
ments, demonstrating that DeepCorr’s learned correlation function
can be used to correlate Tor flows on arbitrary circuits and to arbi-
trary destinations. The third line on the figure shows the results
when the training set is three months old, showing a degraded
performance, as further discussed in the following.
5.3 DeepCorr Does Not Need to Re-Train
Frequently
Since the characteristics of Tor traffic change over time, any
learning-based algorithm needs to be re-trained occasionally to
preserve its correlation performance. We performed two experi-
ments to evaluate how frequently DeepCorr needs to be retrained.
In our first experiment, we evaluated our pre-trained model over
Tor flows collected during 30 consecutive days. Figure 6 presents
the output of the correlation function for each of the days for both
associated and non-associated flow pairs. As we can see, the corre-
lation values for non-associated flows do not change substantially,
however, the correlation values for associated flows starts to slightly
degrade after about three weeks. This suggests that an adversary
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Figure 5: DeepCorr’s performance does not depend on the
circuits and destinations used during the training phase.
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Figure 6: DeepCorr’s correlation values for associated and
non-associated flows for 30 consecutive days without re-
training. The performance only starts to drop after about
three weeks.
will need to retrain her DeepCorr only every three weeks, or even
once a month.
As an extreme case, we also evaluated DeepCorr’s performance
using a model that was trained three months earlier. Figure 5 com-
pares the results in three cases: three months gap between training
and test, oneweek gap between training and test, and no gap.We see
that DeepCorr’s accuracy significantly degrades with three months
gap between training and test—interestingly, even this significantly
degraded performance of DeepCorr due to lack of retraining is
superior to all previous techniques compared in Figure 10.
8
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0 TP
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Number of flows
0.00000
0.00025
0.00050
0.00075
0.00100
FP
Figure 7: DeepCorr’s performance is consistent regardless of
the size of the testing dataset (we use a fixed, arbitrary η).
5.4 DeepCorr’s Performance Does Not Degrade
with the Number of Test Flows
We also show that DeepCorr’s correlation performance does not
depend on the number of flows being correlated, i.e., the size of the
test dataset. Figure 7 presents the TP and FP results (for a specific
threshold) on datasets with different numbers of flows. As can be
seen, the results are consistent for different numbers of flows being
correlated. This suggests that DeepCorr’s correlation performance
will be similar to what derived through our experiments even if
DeepCorr is applied on significantly larger datasets of intercepted
flows, e.g., on the flows collected by a large malicious IXP.
5.5 DeepCorr’s Performance Rapidly Improves
with Flow Length
In all of the previous results, we used a flow length of ℓ = 300
packets. As can be expected, increasing the length of the flows
used for training and testing should improve the performance of
DeepCorr. Figure 8 compares DeepCorr’s performance for different
lengths of flows, showing that DeepCorr’s performance improves
significantly for longer flow observations. For instance, for a target
FP of 10−3, DeepCorr achievesTP = 0.62with ℓ = 100 packets long
flows, while it achieves TP = 0.95 with flows that contain ℓ = 450
packets.
Note that the lengths of intercepted flows makes a tradeoff be-
tween DeepCorr’s performance and the adversary’s computation
overhead. That is, while a larger flow length improves DeepCorr’s
correlation performance, longer flows impose higher storage and
computation overheads on the traffic correlation adversary. A larger
flow length also increase the adversary’s waiting time in detecting
correlated flows in real-time.
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Figure 8: DeepCorr’s performance rapidly improves when
using longer flows for training and testing.
5.6 DeepCorr’s Performance Improves with the
Size of the Training Set
As intuitively expected, DeepCorr’s performance improves when
it uses a larger set of Tor flows during the training phase (i.e.,
DeepCorr learns a better correlation function for Tor with more
training samples). Figure 9 compares DeepCorr’s ROC curve when
trained with different numbers of flows (for all of the experiments,
we use a fixed number of 1,000 flows for testing). The figure confirms
that increasing the size of the training set improves the performance
of DeepCorr. For instance, for a target FP = 10−3, using 1,000
training flows results in TP = 0.56, while using 5,000 flows for
training gives DeepCorr a TP = 0.8. This shows that a resourceful
adversary can improve the accuracy of her flow correlation classifier
by collecting a larger number of Tor flows for training. Note that a
larger training set increases the training time, however the learning
process does not need to repeat frequently as evaluated before.
5.7 DeepCorr Significantly Outperforms the
State-Of-The-Art
In Section 2.2 we overviewed major flow correlation techniques
introduced prior to our work. We perform experiments to compare
DeepCorr’s performance with such prior systems in correlating
Tor flows. Figure 10 compares the ROC curve of DeepCorr to other
systems, in which all the systems are tested on the exact same set
of Tor flows (each flow is at most 300 packets). As can be seen,
DeepCorr significantly outperforms the flow correlation algorithms
used by prior work, as we see a wide gap between the ROC curve of
DeepCorr and other systems. For instance, for a target FP = 10−3,
while DeepCorr achieves a TP of 0.8, previous systems provide
TP rates less than 0.05! This huge improvement comes from the
fact that DeepCorr learns a correlation function tailored to Tor
whereas previous systems use generic statistical correlation metrics
(as introduced in Section 2.2) to link Tor connections.
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Figure 9: DeepCorr’s correlation performance improves
with more training data.
Needless to say, any flow correlation algorithm will improve its
performance by increasing the length of the flows it intercepts for
correlation (equivalently, the traffic volume it collects from each
flow); we showed this in Section 5.5 for DeepCorr. To offer reason-
able accuracies, previous works have performed their experiments
on flows that contain significantly more packets (and more data)
than our experiments. For instance, Sun et al. evaluated the state-of-
the-art RAPTOR [69] in a setting with only 50 flows, and each flow
carries 100MB of data over 5 minutes. This is while in our experi-
ments presented so far, each flow has only 300 packets, which is
equivalent to only ≈ 300 KB of Tor traffic (in contrast to RAPTOR’s
100MB!). To ensure a fair comparison, we evaluate DeepCorr to
RAPTOR in the exact same setup (e.g., 50 flows each 100MB, and
we use the accuracy metric described in Section 4.4). The results
shown in Figure 11 demonstrates DeepCorr’s drastically superior
performance (our results for RAPTOR comply with the numbers
reported by Sun et al. [69]). On the other hand, we show that the
performance gap between DeepCorr and RAPTOR is significantly
wider for shorter flow observations. To show this, we compare
DeepCorr and RAPTOR based on the volume of traffic they inter-
cept from each flow. The results shown in Figure 12 demonstrate
that DeepCorr outperforms significantly, especially for shorter flow
observations. For instance, RAPTOR achieves a 0.95 accuracy af-
ter receiving 100MB from each flow, whereas DeepCorr achieves
an accuracy of 1 with about 3MB of traffic. We see that DeepCorr
is particularly powerful on shorter flow observations. We zoomed
in by comparing RAPTOR and DeepCorr for small number of ob-
served packets, which is shown in Figure 13. We see that DeepCorr
achieves an accuracy of ≈ 0.96 with only 900 packets, in contrast
to RAPTOR’s 0.04 accuracy.
5.8 DeepCorr’s Computational Complexity
In Table 2, we show the time to perform a single DeepCorr correla-
tion in comparison to that of previous techniques (the correlated
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Figure 10: Comparing DeepCorr’s ROC curve with previ-
ous systems shows an overwhelming improvement over
the state-of-the-art (all the systems are tested on the same
dataset of flows, and each flow is 300 packets).
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Figure 11: Comparing DeepCorr to RAPTOR [69] using the
same flow lengths and flow number as the RAPTOR [69] pa-
per.
Table 2: Correlation time comparison with previous tech-
niques
Method One correlation time
RAPTOR 0.8ms
Cosine 0.4ms
Mutual Information 1ms
Pearson 0.4ms
DeepCorr 2ms
10
0.3 11.4 22.5 33.5 44.6 55.7 66.8 77.8 88.9 100.0
Estimated flow size (MBytes)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A
cc
ur
ac
y
DeepCorr
RAPTOR
Figure 12: Comparing the accuracy of DeepCorr and RAP-
TOR [69] for various volumes of data intercepted from each
flow. The RAPTOR values are comparable to Figure 6 of the
RAPTOR paper [69].
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Figure 13: Comparing DeepCorr to RAPTOR in correlating
short flows.
flows are 300 packets long for all the systems). We see that Deep-
Corr is noticeably slower that previous techniques, e.g., roughly
two times slower than RAPTOR. However, note that since all the
systems use the same length of flows, DeepCorr offers drastically bet-
ter correlation performance for the same time overhead; for instance,
based on Figure 10, we see that DeepCorr offers a TP≈ 0.9 when all
previous systems offer a TP less than 0.2. Therefore, when all the
systems offer similar accuracies (e.g., each using various lengths
of input flows) DeepCorr will be faster than all the systems for
the same accuracy. As an example, each RAPTOR correlation takes
20ms (on much longer flow observations) in order to achieve the
same accuracy as DeepCorr which takes only 2ms—i.e., DeepCorr
is 10 times faster for the same accuracy.
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Figure 14: The network architecture of DeepCorr to detect
stepping stone attacks
Compared to previous correlation techniques, DeepCorr is the
only system that has a training phase. We trained DeepCorr using
a standard Nvidia TITAN X GPU (with 1.5GHz clock speed and
12GB of memory) on about 25,000 pairs of associated flow pairs and
25, 000 × 24, 999 ≈ 6.2 × 108 non-associated flow pairs, where each
flow consists of 300 packets. In this setting, DeepCorr is trained
in roughly one day. Recall that as demonstrated in Section 5.3,
DeepCorr does not need to be re-trained frequently, e.g., only once
every three weeks. Also, a resourceful adversary with better GPU
resources than ours will be able to cut down on the training time.
5.9 DeepCorr Works in Non-Tor Applications
as Well
While we presented DeepCorr as a flow correlation attack on Tor, it
can be used to correlate flows in other flow correlation applications
as well. We demonstrate this by applying DeepCorr to the problem
of stepping stone attacks [6, 24, 77]. In this setting, a cybercrimi-
nal proxies her traffic through a compromised machine (e.g., the
stepping stone) in order to hide her identity. Therefore, a network
administrator can use flow correlation to match up the ingress and
egress segments of the relayed connections, and therefore trace
back to the cybercriminal. Previous work has devised various flow
correlation techniques for this application [16, 31, 50, 56, 78].
For our stepping stone detection experiments, we used the
2016 CAIDA anonymized data traces [10]. Similar to the previous
works [31, 32, 50] we simulated the network jitter using Laplace
distribution, and modeled packet drops by a Bernoulli distribution
with different rates. We apply DeepCorr to this problem by learning
DeepCorr in a stepping stone setting. As the noise model is much
simpler in this scenario than Tor, we use a simpler neural network
model for DeepCorr for this application. Also, we only use one di-
rection of a bidirectioal connection to have a fair comparison with
previous systems, which all only use one-sided flows. Figure 14
and Table 3 show our tailored neural network and our choices of
parameters, respectively.
Our evaluations show that DeepCorr provides a perfor-
mance comparable to “Optimal” flow correlation techniques of
Houmansadr et al. [31, 32] when network conditions are stable.
However, when the network conditions becomes noisy, DeepCorr
offers a significantly stronger performance in detecting stepping
stone attacks. This is shown in Figure 15, where the communication
network has a network jitter with a 0.005s standard deviation, and
the network randomly drops 1% of the packets.
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Table 3: DeepCorr’s parameters optimized for the stepping
stone attack application.
Layer Details
Convolution Layer 1
Kernel num: 200
Kernel size: (2, 10)
Stride: (1,1)
Activation: Relu
Max Pool 1 Window size: (1,5)Stride: (1,1)
Fully connected 1 Size: 500, Activation: Relu
Fully connected 2 Size: 100, Activation: Relu
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Figure 15: DeepCorr outperforms state-of-the-art stepping
stone detectors in noisy networks (1% packet drop rate).
6 COUNTERMEASURES
While previous work has studied different countermeasures against
flow correlation [33, 47, 53, 58], they remain mostly non-deployed
presumably due to the poor performance of previous flow correla-
tion techniques at large scale [57, 63]. In the following we discuss
two possible countermeasures.
6.1 Obfuscate Traffic Patterns
An intuitive countermeasure against flow correlation (and similar
traffic analysis attacks like website fingerprinting) is to obfuscate
traffic characteristics that are used by such algorithms. Therefore,
various countermeasures have been suggested that modify packet
timings and packet sizes to defeat flow correlation, in particular by
padding or splitting packets in order to modify packet sizes, or by
delaying packets in order to perturb their timing characteristics.
The Tor project, in particular, has deployed various pluggable trans-
ports [58] in order to defeat censorship by nation-states who block
all Tor traffic. Some of these pluggable transports only obfuscate
packet contents [53], some of them obfuscate the IP address of the
Tor relays [45], and some obfuscate traffic patterns [47, 53]. Note
that Tor’s pluggable transports are designed merely for the purpose
of censorship resistance, and they obfuscate traffic only from a
censored client to her first Tor relay (i.e., a Tor bridge). Therefore,
Tor’s pluggable transports are not deployed by any of Tor’s public
relays.
As a possible countermeasure against DeepCorr, we suggest to
deploy traffic obfuscation techniques by all Tor relays (including
the guard and middle relays). We evaluated the impact of several
Tor pluggable transports on DeepCorr’s performance. Currently,
the Tor project has three deployed plugs: meek, obfs3, and obs4. We
evaluated DeepCorr on meek and obfs4 (obfs3 is an older version
of obfs4). We also evaluated two modes of obfs4: one with IAT
mode “on” [52], which obfuscates traffic features, and one with the
IAT mode “off”, which does not obfuscate traffic features. We used
DeepCorr to learn and correlate traffic on these plugs. However, due
to ethical reasons, we collected a much smaller set of flows for these
experiments compared to our previous experiments; this is because
Tor bridges are very scarce and expensive, and we therefore avoided
overloading the bridges.5 Consequently, our correlation results are
very optimistic due to their small training datasets (e.g., a real-
world adversary will achieve much higher correlation accuracies
with adequate training). We browsed 500 websites over obfs4 with
and without the IAT mode on, as well as over meek. We trained
DeepCorr on only 400 flows (300 packets each) for each transport
(in contrast to 25,000 flows in our previous experiments), and tested
on another 100 flows. Table 4 summarizes the results. We see that
meek and obfs4 with IAT=0 provide no protection to DeepCorr; note
that a 0.5 TP is comparable to what we get for bare Tor if trained
on only 400 flows (see Figure 9), therefore we expect correlation
results similar to bare Tor with a larger training set. The results are
intuitive: meek merely obfuscates a bridge’s IP and does not deploy
traffic obfuscation (except for adding natural network noise). Also
obfs4 with IAT=0 solely obfuscates packet contents, but not traffic
features. On the other hand, we see that DeepCorr has a significantly
lower performance in the presence of obfs4 with IAT=1 (again,
DeepCorr’s accuracy will be higher for a real-world adversary who
collects more training flows).
Our results suggest that (public) Tor relays should deploy a traf-
fic obfuscation mechanism like obfs4 with IAT=1 to resist advanced
flow correlation techniques like DeepCorr. However, this is not a
trivial solution due to the increased cost, increased overhead (band-
width and CPU), and reduced QoS imposed by such obfuscation
mechanisms. Even the majority [52] of Obfsproxy Tor bridges run
obfs4 without traffic obfuscation (IAT=0). Therefore, designing an
obfuscation mechanism tailored to Tor that makes the right balance
between performance, cost, and anonymity remains a challenging
problem for future work.
6.2 Reduce An Adversary’s Chances of
Performing Flow Correlation
Another countermeasure against flow correlation on Tor is reducing
an adversary’s chances of intercepting the two ends of many Tor
connections (therefore, reducing her chances of performing flow
correlation). As discussed earlier, recent studies [20, 49, 69] show
that various ASes and IXPs intercept a significant fraction of Tor
5Alternatively, we could set up our own Tor bridges for the experiments. We decided
to use real-world bridges to incorporate the impact of actual traffic loads in our
experiments.
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Table 4: DeepCorr’s performance if Tor’s pluggable trans-
ports are deployed by the relays (results are very optimistic
due to our small training set, which is for ethical reasons).
Plug name TP FP
obfs4 with IAT=0 ≈ 0.50 0.0005
meek ≈ 0.45 0.0005
obfs4 with IAT=1 ≈ .10 0.001
traffic, putting them in an ideal position to perform flow correlation
attacks. To counter, several proposals suggest new relay selection
mechanisms for Tor that reduce the interception chances of mali-
cious ASes [2, 5, 39, 51, 68, 70]. None of such alternatives have been
deployed by Tor due to their negative impacts on performance,
costs, and privacy. We argue that designing practical AS-aware
relay selection mechanisms for Tor is a promising avenue to defend
against flow correlation attacks on Tor.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We design a flow correlation system, called DeepCorr, that drasti-
cally outperforms the state-of-the-art systems in correlating Tor
connections. DeepCorr leverages an advanced deep learning archi-
tecture to learn a flow correlation function tailored to Tor’s complex
network (as opposed to previous works’ use of general-purpose
statistical correlation metrics). We show that with adequate learn-
ing, DeepCorr can correlate Tor connections (and therefore break
its anonymity) with accuracies significantly stronger than existing
algorithms, and using substantially shorter lengths of flow obser-
vations. We hope that our work demonstrates the escalating threat
of flow correlation attacks on Tor in rise of advanced learning algo-
rithms, and calls for the deployment of effective countermeasures
by the Tor community.
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